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Multiple responsivity: strata of bodily expression1*
Bodily expression and the experience of the other in the 
phenomenological tradition
In the present paper we analyse the multiple activity of bodily expression, differentiate its strata, relying 
on phenomenological and psychoanalytic traditions. We will distinguish the primordial layer of bodily 
expression brought to the fore by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Daniel N. Stern from the unconscious 
symbolic expression captured by Freud and from the conscious symbolic bodily expression best known 
in everyday life. By the end we will place the multiple phenomena of bodily expression in a responsive 
phenomenological framework.
In the phenomenological tradition the analysis of bodily expression has been closely intertwined 
with the theme of other selves since Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation.2 According to Husserl’s analy-
sis , the primordial sphere of bodily experience carries a peculiar duality: on the one hand I am identical 
to my body, I act through my body as a body-subject (Leib), but on the other hand I perceive my body as 
an alien, physical object which is available for others, too (Körper).  This double sense of body-experien-
ce transcends the solipsistic danger philosophy inherited from Cartesian tradition. The experience of my 
own body carries foreign elements, while the other’s body is not quite an object for me: our behaviours 
are intertwined, affected by each other before saying a word. The spontaneous fit of bodily expressions 
and behaviours is the primordial layer of experience that gives the most original, unquestionable messa-
ge about the functioning of other subjects, making solipsism impossible.
This idea pushed against the limits of Husserlian interpretation of expression. Husserl considered 
expression generally passive, he thought of the linguistic expression as not adding any quality to the 
expressed thought, merely a tool. This position was left behind by the later development of phenomen-
ology. In the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, linguistic expression opens original creative forces, and 
bodily attunement represents specific understanding of existence, so neither language nor body are 
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lifeless means of expression. Maurice Merleau-Ponty went even further, and made the creative event of 
expression a central principle of his philosophy3. According to him, there is no idea that would carry me-
aning in itself, ahead of a dynamic system of expressions. Thought cannot be separated from language, 
nor can language be independent of the liveliness of working speech: speech derives its final meaning 
not only from words, but also from emphasis, accent, gestures, and facial expression. This surplus of 
reason no longer reveals merely the thoughts of the speaker, but rather the “source of his thoughts, his 
basic mode of existence”. The surplus of expressive speech refers to the surplus of the bodily expression: 
the bodily expression is the prototype of all expressions and creations.
Responsive phenomenology further radicalized Husserl’s coupling of bodily expression and ot-
herness: not only took out bodily self-perception from the transcendental philosophical framework but 
reinterpreted body experience as an expression of our original responsivity.4  For the philosophy of the 
late Lévinas or Waldenfels the surplus of bodily expression manifests not only the hidden forces of one’s 
own subjectivity, but the manifestation of the original sensuous response given to the other.  We are not 
able to escape totally from our spontaneous, primordial bodily responsiveness, but we are free to assume 
it, and to turn it into a blood and flesh responsibility. The responsibility becomes an ethical act, which in-
volves not only the real perception of the other’s claim but the ability of the creative answer to the alien.
Bodily expression and psychoanalysis
The theme of bodily expression was also at the heart of classical psychoanalysis, as it was Freud who 
discovered the immense instinctive energy in corporeality: for him, the body is no longer externally 
connected to the soul, but it is the inner energy source of the psyche.5 The instinct, which is the inva-
sion of the body into the soul indirectly proclaims itself in symbolic forms of unconscious processes, 
dreams, utterances, unconscious actions and other symptoms. Conscious behaviours and thoughts are 
interpreted as unconscious expressions of hidden instincts; and in the psychoanalytic process, these un-
conscious, symbolic messages come to the surface, receive meaning, and become part of the self. In the 
post-Freudian history of psychoanalysis, the range of analysed bodily phenomena has expanded, and, 
like in phenomenology, the analysis of the primordial, presymbolic, implicit bodily expression has come 
to the fore, renewing the interpretation of therapeutic relationship, too.
3   Merleau-Ponty, Maurice: Phenomenology of Perception. Trans: Colin Smith. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London, 1962.
4   Levinas, E.: Totalité et infini: Essai sur l’extériorité. La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.; Lévinas, E.: Autrement qu’être 
ou au-delà de l’essence. La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.;Waldenfels, B.: From Intentionality to Responsivity. In R. Ber-
net & D.J. Martino (eds.), Phenomenology Today: The Schuwer Spep Lectures, 1998-2002. Pittsburg, Duquesne Universi-
ty, 2003.; Tengelyi L.: Tapasztalat és kifejezés. Budapest, Atlantisz, 2007. 
5   Sigmund Freud: An outline of psychoanalysis. New York, W.W. Norton, 1949.
Within the circle of psychoanalytic schools debating Freud’s theory and competing with each 
other, there were attempts to interpret personal development, the formation of subjective self-senses in 
a phenomenological way, and not to confuse phenomenological analysis with biological explanations. 
Such is the case of self-psychology founded by Heinz Kohut in the 1960s, and is still developing as a 
contemporary form of psychoanalytic treatment. Self-psychological tradition aims to understand indivi-
duals from within, analysing their subjective experience via introspection and empathy, basing therape-
utic interpretations on the understanding of the self as the central agency of the human psyche. 
The most important version of self-psychology for our topic was Daniel N. Stern’s theory, which 
created a bridge between psychoanalysis and research-based developmental models. Stern was the one 
who described the early events of self-organization specifically as bodily experiences and expressions. 
His focus was not so much on repressed, unconscious processes, but on the “implicit relational know-
ledge” carried in body sensations and procedural patterns.6 For Stern our early self-senses are formed by 
the continual work of the so called “vitality affects”, which term he introduced in opposition to so-called 
‘categorical affects’7. What is the difference between the two? Usually we think of affective experiences 
in terms of Darwinian affects: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise, interest, and perhaps 
shame. Vitality affects are somewhat different, they emerge as the first, presymbolic, dynamic qualities 
of our existence, and of interpersonal relatedness. We are never without them, while categorical affects 
come and go. We always feel them, just as we feel we are alive, as we always feel a continual, inter-
sensory affect of our moving and perceiving body, interconnected with its surroundings and with other 
living creatures. Vitality affects form the special qualities of first, presymbolic self-senses and early 
interpersonal relatedness. The mother bends to her baby, the baby raises its head, the mother caresses 
the head, the baby uses its voice, and the mother responds saying something in the same rhythm. There 
is an unconscious interpersonal and intersensory attunement of motions and perceptions, forming a 
common tissue of their lives. The baby feels the mother’s movements, which fit to its own movements, 
and this joining forms the baby’s self-perception. The care-giver continually mirrors, reflects and vali-
dates the baby’s emerging self-senses; this vital fitting is very close in the first months, but later reduces 
in intensity. This intermodal–interpersonal fitting, and at the same time a differing interplay forms the 
grounding for self-development in the course of which the child assumes the sense of being an entity 
distinct from other objects in its environment.8 If the child does not get adequate responses from the 
parents, her/his implicit relational knowing with the vital “core” of the self gets damaged. The perpetual 
movement of vitality affects creates and recreates the core of our self, the fundamental moods of our 
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personality for the whole of our lives from beginning to end.
The exploration of vitality affects and implicit relational knowledge changed psychoanalytic thin-
king, freed it from some remnants of Cartesian dualism, similarly, as the analysis of lived body has 
played a key role in overcoming dualism and solipsism in phenomenological tradition.  Daniel Stern’s 
theory of self-development is congenial with the body-phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and we will 
rely on both theories when differentiating presymbolic and symbolic dimensions of bodily expression. 
Merleau-Ponty: The body as original source of expression
In the phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the moving, perceiving, understanding 
body presents itself as an existential modality. We do not have our body; we are our body. We live the 
meaningful life of our body. It is an original field of creativity, a primordial source of all higher expressi-
on9. Corporeal expression is similar to the expressivity of the arts. As in the case of the arts, the content 
of corporeal expression is inseparable from the expression itself; and what is more, the expression is in-
separable from the person who is being expressed. “The body is to be compared, not to a physical object, 
but rather to a work of art”10. We are not able to explain the essence of a Cezanne picture to someone who 
has never seen it, to express a Mozart sonata to someone who has never heard it. “In a picture or a piece 
of music the idea is incommunicable by means other than the display of colours and sounds”11. “A novel, 
poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which the expression is indistinguis-
hable from the thing expressed, their meaning accessible only through direct contact…” 12 Similarly, the 
expression of a human face or a moving body bears a certain style, an implicit meaning, which we are 
not able to translate to other languages. Moreover, in the case of bodily expression, not only expression 
and expressed content are the same, but the individual who is expressed coincides with the expression 
itself. While the works of arts as a poem or a sculpture express the artist symbolically and indirectly, 
bodily movement expresses the person not only symbolically, but also immediately and directly. There 
is a certain style of touching and seeing, walking and sitting, crying and laughing which makes possible 
the original intersensory integration of body experiences and makes possible personal identity as well. 
This fact gives a special strength to corporeal expression. That is why human body and movement carry 
an original expressive character13. 
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Already Max Scheler has shown that behind the movements of anger is not anger as a “mental 
state,” behind the gestures of or joy or boredom is not another joy, or another boredom. We perceive 
shame in blush itself, joy in laughter.  14 I do not infer the joy from the expression on my own face, but I 
feel the joy. I do not perceive the other as an external object as a sign, or image that refers to the psyche, 
but I see her as a subject of her living body. The body can symbolize existence because it realizes it and 
it is its own actuality. Although the bodily expression is similar to the artistic expression, it also has a 
peculiar surplus over the work of art: not only the expression and the expressed content coincide, but the 
work itself is one with the creator.
Of course bodily expression is not always immediate and integrated. We perceive the world 
through our body, but at the same time we perceive our own body as an object in the world. As we had 
showed before, the “double-sensation” of the body has been a central topic in phenomenology. We feel 
our body in two different ways: on the one hand it is a primordial subjective style of our movements 
and perceptions, on the other hand we can perceive it as an object for others and for ourselves; we can 
use our body as a tool, as an instrument of expression. Bodily expression has presymbolic and symbolic 
strata. We are able to feel the implicit senses of our body, but we are also able to bracket our body-senses 
for a while; we are able to suppress or conceal them. Shaking hands, turning our back to someone, or 
clapping at political gatherings - these intentional gestures are explicit, mostly symbolic, or conventio-
nal. We are able to express or hide ourselves with them, and we can use them as portable instruments of 
expression. But even in these cases, an implicit, presymbolic level is at work throughout the process of 
bodily self-expression: we are the ones who use ourselves like this; we are the ones who make gestures 
like this. In the background of these symbolic acts, we feel our own movements, we feel our own body 
somehow, as a non-symbolized sense-horizon of all our movements and perceptions. Our symbolic acts 
always have a nonsymbolic, existential background of our body as an existential modality, which we 
can never utterly leave behind. The original style of our movement and perception always remains with 
us: it is the vital source of any acts of symbolization.
Strata of bodily expression
Conscious symbolic bodily expression
The most obvious kind of bodily expression is the conscious symbolic bodily expression. There are bo-
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dily gestures in which the expresser consciously uses his body as a sign, as an instrument of expression, 
and the connection between the expression and the expressed meaning is a culturally encoded symbolic 
message. For example, we shake hands with someone, nod our heads, or clap in the theatre. The cultural 
regulation of bodily behaviour gives conventional meaning to human movements. However, this mea-
ning is more or less related to the body from outside: the same gesture may mean differently in different 
cultures.
A special phenomenon of conscious symbolic bodily expression is bodily simulation. In this case, 
the body does not express itself sincerely, the simulator is hiding behind its own bodily expression with 
which he himself does not coincide completely. He uses his body as a sign, an instrument that does not 
manifest but hides the original expression. Even the usual bodily signs of anger or joy can be simulated 
to some extent. In such cases, bodily expressions function as consciously usable, manipulable signs: 
expression, expresser, and expressed content are separated from each other in these cases. The subject 
hides behind its expression, thus, it is not existential bodily expression that occurs, but communication 
with bodily signs.
Unconscious symbolic bodily expression
However, there are also symbolic manifestations of bodily expression that also refer to something 
beyond themselves, but they are unconscious and not manipulated by the expresser. The study of such 
unconscious bodily expressions set in motion classical psychoanalysis. Freud began to examine hysteri-
cal symptoms that seemed medically unjustifiable and chaotic as symbolic expressions of hidden, other-
wise inexpressible contents. Let’s look at an example: Merleau-Ponty writes about a case where a young 
girl can’t swallow and talk, even though the medical cause of the swallowing and speech disorder can’t 
be established.15 The symptoms are made clear only by the girl’s story: her parents forbade her love, but 
she doesn’t dare confront them, yet she can’t give up on her lover either. She’s in a situation, which she 
can’t stand, she can’t “swallow”. She would rather withdraw from the world of linguistic communication 
than have to go through the unbearable contradiction. In hysterical cases, bodily symptom is an un-
conscious symbolic expression of repressed and unacceptable mental conflicts. For example, hysterical 
blindness can occur when the patient does not want to see something, hysterical paralysis, gait disorder 
if she is unable to move on. These symptoms are not fixed signs, their meaning cannot be recorded in a 
dictionary, so hysterical disease always includes a kind of creativity - similar to expression in a dream. 
The hysterical symptom has no organic cause, but is involuntary, the patient cannot intentionally cause 
it, so it is not simulated at all. The symptom expresses ambiguous unconscious feelings from which the 
15   Merleau-Ponty, Maurice: Phenomenology of Perception. 185.
patient escapes: simultaneously hides and shows the expressor who is torn, loosing unity with herself. 
As she hides from us, she shows something she doesn’t want to show.
Of course, the unconscious symbolic bodily phenomena are not confined to the world of psycho-
pathologies. In a milder form, healthy bodily experience also creates similar psychosomatic symbol-
ism.   If we really don’t want to go to someone, we stumble more easily or get lost our way. We tend to 
hunch from not only physical but also mental burdens. There are many aspects of our movement, our 
physical behaviour, that we are not aware of, but that others are about to see as a symbolic message. 
Consciously unacceptable, repressed emotional impulses show themselves in the symbolic language of 
bodily symptoms. The expression of the hysterical girl is thus indirect: she cannot experience her anger 
against her parents, she does not blush into it, she does not shout. Instead of spontaneity of direct bodily 
expression, she can only communicate with an indirect symbolic expression, such as an inability to 
swallow. The indirect, symbolic meaning of her communication must be deciphered by others. Her “ori-
ginal”, forbidden primordial bodily expression gives place to other, substituting primordial expression 
of inability, which refers to a hidden feeling.  We see, what a thin boundary separates the presymbolic 
domain from symbolic unconscious bodily expression.
Primordial presymbolic bodily expression
Here the body is not an expression of something else, but a primordial immediacy of itself. There is 
nothing to decipher: anger, and the one who feels it are present directly in the blush itself. I myself am 
my angry blush. The blush does not symbolically express some other hidden feeling, but manifests me 
directly. It is true that we can manipulate such bodily expressions to some degree, or we can lose them 
more or less, but we are able to do so because bodily expression has an original primordial layer that 
precedes all objectification. The various forms of symbolic expression rely on precisely these primor-
dial, “core” bodily self-senses – as Daniel N Stern’s psychoanalytic theory explained.16 Expression of 
“categorical” affects are always conveyed by the stream of vitality affects, symbolic expressions are 
always impregnated by presymbolic, vital expressions.  When I simulate, I imitate a primary expressi-
on. It is from this level that Merleau-Ponty says that the “nexus of living meanings” of the lived body 
is “the ability of natural expression” that precedes all symbolic meanings as its source.17 If we ask the 
question of what the primordial bodily expression expresses, the answer will be: not “what”, but “how”! 
Not “what”, but “who”! It does not express just a thought or repressed content, but it expresses a special 
surplus, the very source of our thoughts and repressions, it expresses the existential quality as we sense 
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ourselves, as we move ourselves and respond to others
In the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty primary bodily expression is an existentiale, but not as a so-
litary creation: it operates in the context of a pre-existing intercorporeal field. Intercorporeity, this “un-
justifiable certitude of a sensible world”, is an anonymous sensibility shared out among distinct bodies: 
“just as my two hands communicate across the lateral synergy of my body, I can touch the sensibility of 
another”. 18  Intercorporeal sensibility, though the most elementary intertwining with the lives of others, 
also carries a peculiar duality. On the one hand, the others’ smiles, yawns, tensions stick to us, we can-
not not tune in to the primordial expressions of others. On the other hand, we spontaneously distance 
ourselves form the others’ states; our elementary bodily self-perception takes shape in relation to the 
different states of the others. The differentiation of one’s own and alien experiences begins to articulate 
at the level of primordial bodily expressions: the more complex messages of symbolic bodily expressi-
ons rely on this original differentiation. 
Primordial responsivity
Following this direction, responsive turn of phenomenology further radicalized the understanding of 
bodily expression.  For the late Lévinas or Waldenfels the surplus of bodily expression manifests not 
only the existential core of one’s own subjectivity, but the manifestation of the original sensible response 
given to the other.  The quality of our actual movements, perceptions, affections carry traces of distant 
times, they emerge as living responses to the desires of our ancestors, finitude and aging refer to the 
perspectives of the descendants. Primordial sensibility is something that goes beyond the capacity of 
subjectivity, it has a diachronic character. As Waldenfels explains: “in the end, our bodily and embodied 
experiences show that I have the Other within myself and myself within the Other before we encounter 
each other.”19
The very existence of our living body generates an ongoing implicit resonance to others, making 
us primordially defenceless. “Sensibility is the exposedness to the other”20. This exposedness explicitly 
show itself at the beginning and at the end of life, and perhaps at times of serious crisis or love, when we 
are totally entrusted to the others’ care. But vital sensibility nurtures us, provokes us during our whole 
lifetime, even though we make serious efforts to eliminate our primordial exposedness. 
For Daniel Stern’s model of self-development the main existential problem infants have to solve 
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during the early childhood is not that how to get to be attuned to others, but how to stop original, on-
going, overwhelming attunement.21 As we saw above symbolic levels of bodily expression create distance 
from primordial bodily responsivity. In the case of unconscious symbolic expression the subject hides her 
primordial state behind another one, without knowing it, sometimes losing her integrity, and the imme-
diate contact with other people. In the case of conscious bodily expression we directly use our body as an 
instrument or tool to give signs to others. We overshadow our primordial bodily responsiveness for the 
sake of conscious actions, for “higher” goals, necessary works, social cooperation or rivalry. 
Full blown conscious activity while creating a common universe of objective meanings, signs 
and concepts, distances itself from the body’s overwhelming sensibility.  Distancing from primordial 
responsivity makes possible the mind’s “independent” intentional activity, its objectifying, controlling 
work. But intentional work of consciousness     — striving for a whole object structure — always extends 
beyond its possibilities and “thinks more” than what is available to experience. 22 Its identifying activity 
creates symbolic meanings, “objective”, third-person orders, morals - a generality that obscures the 
primordial sources of our experiences. Of course we are not able to live without this third person gene-
rality, without objective knowledge, solid norms, social systems and laws. But we must not forget, that 
conscious subject, which creates its symbolic world has responsive origin: its own identity is articulated 
when addressed by others, in response to others, in the attention of others, in the dichotomy of own and 
foreign experiences. “Responsivity goes beyond every intentionality because responding to that which 
happens to us cannot be exhausted in the meaning, understanding, or truth of our response. All this is 
not restricted to the affective background of our cognitive and practical modes of comportment; it con-
cerns these modes in their essence…” 23
    The reception or rejection of the other takes shape first as a responsive sensibility, proceeding 
any kind of symbolic activity. Conscious or unconscious gestures are built on this primordial founda-
tion. If we totally escape from our sensible exposedness, if we block the flow of vitality affects we lose 
our ability to receive the other, as Other. Yet if we learn to stay close to vital sources of responsivity, if 
we learn to mobilize its energies, we become able to provide a creative response when addressed by the 
other. Creative response translates our spontaneous resonances into “something else”. While respond-
ing to the alien we begin to change: we recognize ourselves in new ways. We become able to turn our 
spontaneous, primordial bodily responsiveness into a blood and flesh responsibility for the other. The 
responsibility becomes an ethical act, which involves not only the real perception of the other’s claim 
but the ability of the creative answer to the alien.    
21   Stern, N. Daniel: The Interpersonal World of the Infant. 53–61.
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